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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Law and Morality
Lawyers and the profession they practice are held in extremely
low esteem by the general public.2 However, most participants
in the legal system tend to regard their own lawyers with much
higher respect.3 This discrepancy may largely be a function of
the difference between the theoretical view of how society
should function ("There are too many laws (or lawyers)") and
the more pragmatic view that legal service recipients hold of
their ability to take advantage of the legal system ("He may be a
shyster, but he is my shyster"). Nevertheless, low regard for law-
yers and the law stems, in part, from the fact that society, unlike
specific consumers of the law, places unrealistic expectations on
lawyers and the law. Specifically, society has come to replace the
concept of morality with the concept of legality. As a result, soci-
ety depends on lawyers to achieve morality, something that An-
glo-American law was never intended- and is ill-equipped-to
do.
This article will not address the extent to which law is or
should be based in morality. Rather, through analysis of the
novels of Charles Dickens, this article explores the inadequacy of
law as a means to achieve moral ends. One commentator re-
cently explored the law's capacity to effectuate social change, re-
ferring to the effort as a "hollow hope."4 In particular, he
suggested that law and lawsuits are not the proper tools to
2. See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Anti-Lauyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., August 9, 1993, at
1. A national survey conducted in July 1993 indicates that just two percent of respon-
dents, down from five percent in 1986, said they had the most respect for lawyers
among ten identified professions. Id. One commentator attributes growing animosity
toward lawyers to the burgeoning use of the legal system and the role of "lawyers as
agents of equalizing change in society." Id.
In 1973, the percentage of Americans with "great confidence" in law firms was 24
percent, compared with 18 percent in 1978 and 14 percent in 1988. Gary A. Hengstler,
The Public Perception of Lauyers: ABA Pol4 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 64. In 1993, only 8
percent of Americans had a great deal of confidence in law firms. Id.
3. According to a National Law Journal/West Publishing Co. poll, more people
are using lawyers and they generally are satisfied with the legal services they receive.
Samborn, supra note 2, at 1. Of those who have retained a lawyer during the past ten
years, nearly two-thirds were satisfied with that lawyer's performance, and 43 percent
said they were very satisfied. Hengstler, supra note 2, at 61.
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achieve desired social ends.5 This article examines a similar
"hollow hope" that laws and lawsuits can achieve morality and
make moral actors of those upon whom the law acts. This
"hollow hope" of morality is based on an unwise premise: that by
merely following the dictates of the law one can achieve all the
morality and moral behavior that one needs or for which one
can ask. On the contrary, law-a system of coercive and socially-
imposed rules 6-and morality-largely a personal value system
with coercive power-are separate and distinct. This article
cautions that we confuse the two at our peril. Dickens, an early
commentator on lawyers and the law, clearly perceived and ar-
ticulated the difference between law and morality. One may re-
cover a valuable perspective on that difference through an
examination of some of his novels.
8
5. Rosenberg cogently argues that, contrary to the views of many lawyers and
others, courts and litigation are not effective in producing significant social change.
Based on empirical studies related to recent changes in civil rights, women's rights, and
other areas, Rosenberg attributes the courts' lack of social impact on their dependence
on political support to produce significant reform and their lack of implementation
powers. Id. at 336-43.
6. The theory that law is a coercive system is based on 19th-century philosopher
John Austin's model of law as a system of commands. W.L. MORRISON, JoHN AUSTIN 35
(1982). See alsoJ. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 97, 154 n.208 (1988-89) (discussing Austin's theory that the essence of law is coer-
cion). While its definitions vary greatly, law is generally agreed to contain coercive ele-
ments. Christine A. Desan, Expanding the Legal Vocabulary: The Challenge Posed by the
Deconstruction and Defense of Law, 95 YALE L.J. 969, 982 n.60 (1986) (discussing also the
proposition that law must be understood as "a continuing articulation of social order").
Law as a force, free from moral elements results in the concept that law is a "coer-
cive force." A.N. Yiannoupoulos, Two Critical Yeats in the Life of the Louisiana Civil Code:
1870 and 1913, 52 LA. L. REv. 5, 21 n.86 (1992-93). One commentator noted that the
"[c]ommon figure of the lawyer as a 'hired gun' attributed to the law a coerciveness that
seems incompatible with its having any necessarily social or moral value." Steven J.
Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 63 CAL. L. REv. 747, 756-62 (1989).
7. Morality "substitutes for the official source and the organized sanction [of the
law] as an appeal to the conscience to consider the impact of actions on others." PHILIP
SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW, 4 (1982). See BL.4cK's LAW DIcroNARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining the term "moral" as "[c ] ognizable or enforceable only by the conscience or by
the principles of right conduct, as distinguished from positive law"); Desan, supra note
6, at 982 n.60 ("[s]ocial coordination, minus the coercive element, seems a workable
description of morality or ethics"). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459-64 (1896-97) (discussing the differences between law and
morality and cautioning confusion of the two principles).
8. Although beyond the scope of this article, the thesis proposed here is consis-
tent with that expressed by others who have examined the way in which law has sup-
planted religion as the means by which we express and explore our most basic norms.
One author has recently noted how legal culture and legal reasoning treat religion as
unimportant and trivial. STEPHEN L. CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND PoLrrIcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). Others have commented on
19941
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B. Law and Literature
This article is a contribution to the recently rediscovered
realm of law and literature, which addresses two primary ap-
proaches. The first, literature as law or law in literature, exam-
ines fictional texts that focus on law or lawyers. The second, law
as literature, centers on the use of literary theory or literary tech-
nique to analyze legal texts.9
Most writings in law and literature tend to either use works of
fiction on legal matters to address legal themes, or use legal texts
and explore those texts using literary theories and techniques.' °
While some essays on law and literature address both ap-
proaches, law in literature and law as literature, 1 typically a spe-
cific work under consideration is treated either as a work of
fiction to be analyzed for its legal themes or as a legal text to be
analyzed with literary techniques. Rarely, if ever, is a specific
work examined from both the law in literature and the law as
literature perspectives. This article intends to combine the two
approaches of law in literature and law as literature by analyzing
certain novels of Charles Dickens. In addition to exploring the
legal themes incorporated in Dickens's novels, this article ap-
plies current literary theory to examine legal texts within one of
the novels.
This article proposes that the law, lawyers, and legal texts are
not particularly effective devices to achieve morality or moral re-
sults. Part II provides an overview of Charles Dickens's perspec-
tives on the law of 19th century England. Part III presents a
survey of the more "legal" novels of Dickens and examines how
they demonstrate that law and lawyers not only fail to advance
morality and justice, but, in fact, significantly undermine and ob-
struct moral decency. Part IV applies some of the literary theo-
the way in which the United States Constitution has, in effect, become scripture and, in
some senses, our American religion. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
9. For general overviews of law and literature studies, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP (1988); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS
AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992). For an overview of the use of
literary theory as applied to legal texts, see SANFORD LEVINSON & STEVEN MAILLOUX,
INTERPRETING LAw AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (1988). For a short intro-
duction to the field of law and literature, see Larry M. Wertheim, Law and Literature:
Literature as Law/Law as Literature, BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA, Oct. 1992, at 16-20.
10. See Wertheim, supra note 9, at 18-19.
11. See POSNER, supra note 9; WEISBERG, supra note 9.
[Vol. 20
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ries of Stanley Fish 12 to two legal texts in Dickens's first novel,
The Pickwick Papers, demonstrating the indeterminacy of texts,
legal and otherwise. While Fish himself does not expressly con-
sider questions of morality, this section exposes the flimsy reed
that supports morality when morality is based merely upon legal
texts. Part V explores the 'Jurisprudence" of Dickens. Finally,
the article concludes that neither the law (nor, for that matter,
Dickens's novels) are the final sources of justice and moral
behavior.
II. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW IN THE
NOVELS OF CHARLES DICKENS
To a greater extent than virtually any other novelist in the
English-speaking language, Charles Dickens drew upon lawyers
and the law as characters in and substance for his novels.13 From
The Pickwick Papers to The Mystery of Edwin Drood, Dickens richly
populated his novels with lawyers, trials, and the law. Dickens,
although not formally trained as a lawyer, worked extensively as
a law clerk, a court reporter, and a reporter for Parliament. 4 At
one time, he seriously considered studying for the bar.15
This familiarity with lawyers and their milieu permitted Dick-
ens to depict lawyers and legal matters with deftness and assur-
ance. However, his lack of legal training and his interest in
lawyers and the law for the limited purposes of atmosphere and
dramatic potential resulted in lackadaisical attention to techni-
cal rules of the law. 6 In fact, Dickens only took interest in legal
12. Stanley Fish is Professor of English and Law at Duke University. Stanley Fish,
How Come You Do Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEx. L. REV. 57 (1993).
13. Richard Posner has briefly addressed the legal implications of some of the
novels of Charles Dickens. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 128-29. Richard Weisberg, many
of whose insights are very helpful, has addressed some of Dickens's novels more exten-
sively. See WEISBERG, supra note 9, at 58-73. For other general discussions of the legal
significance of the novels of Charles Dickens, see WILLAM S. HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES
DICKENS AS A LEGAL HisroRIAN (1972); Robert S. Glaser & Stephen H. Roth, In the Mat-
ter of Heep, Jaggers, Tulkinghorn & Fogg: An Unjarndyced View of the Dickensian Bar, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 278 (1976); Allen Boyer, The Antiquarian and the Utilitarian: Charles
Dickens vs. James Fitzjames Stephens, 56 TENN. L. REv. 595 (1989); William W. Bleifuss,
Charles Dickens and the Law (1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Minnesota (Minneapolis)).
14. Boyer, supra note 13, at 607-08; Glaser & Roth, supra note 13, at 279.
15. Glaser & Roth, supra note 13, at 279.
16. HoLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 6; Boyer, supra note 13, at 613. See infra notes
35, 38, 40, 45, and 72 and accompanying text for examples of Dickens's inattention to
technical rules of law.
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technicalities when he could point to a particularly curious rule
and use it for dramatic effect. 7 For example, in Oliver Twist, Mr.
Bumble is advised of the common law presumption that a wife
who commits a crime in the presence of her husband is pre-
sumed to have done it under his coercion:
"If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his
hat emphatically in both hands, "the law is a ass-a idiot. If
that's the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst I
wish the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience-by
experience.""'
In contrast to his apparent interest in the effect of law and
lawyers on their clients and society in general, Dickens paid
scant attention to the professional matters that concern lawyers.
This lack of interest in the work of his characters, however, was
not limited to lawyers. As George Orwell noted,
As soon as [Dickens] has to deal with trade, finance, industry
or politics he takes refuge in vagueness, or in satire. This is
the case even with legal processes, about which actually he
must have known a good deal. Compare any lawsuit in Dick-
ens with the lawsuit in Or/ey Farm, for instance.
1 9
As this article will establish, Dickens exhibited a rather studied
disregard for legal technicalities. This lack of attention to detail
may be attributed to the furious rate at which Dickens produced
his voluminous novels, which often were written-sometimes si-
multaneously-for weekly or monthly serialization.20 Moreover,
Dickens often edited his own monthly efforts at journalism.
2 1
Even a cursory examination of his novels indicates that Dick-
ens generally held a very negative view of law and lawyers. This
should not, however, lead one to the conclusion that he re-
garded law and lawyers as a unique blight upon mankind.
Rather, Dickens considered virtually all societal institutions as
blighted. Contrary to his current reputation as a 19th century
17. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 6.
18. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Penguin Books 1966)
(1837-39), ch. 51 at 461-62.
19. GEORGE ORWELL, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 82 (1946). Orley Farm is a novel by
Dickens's contemporary, Anthony Trollope. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (David
Skilton ed., 1985) (1860-61). Trollope's novel involves a perjury trial arising out of a
prior lawsuit dealing with a disputed will codicil. In this novel, Trollope, who was not a
lawyer, addresses in great detail various legal matter, including the very wisdom of the
adversarial principle. Id. at x-xi.
20. See generally, NORMAN PAGE, A DICKENS COMPANION (1984).
21. Id. at 313.
[Vol. 20
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reformer and despite his criticisms of numerous English institu-
tions-the law, schools, Parliament, and the treatment of the
poor, among them-Dickens was not as interested in reforming
these institutions as he was in castigating them. As literary critic
Edmund Wilson pointed out in his famous essay, Dickens: The
Two Scrooges, "Dickens is almost invariably against institutions:...
whenever he comes to deal with Parliament and its laws, the
courts and the public officials.., he makes them either ridicu-
lous or cruel, or both at the same time."22
Dickens's lack of interest in the reformation of legal as well as
other institutions was similarly observed by George Orwell in his
penetrating essay on Charles Dickens:
The truth is that Dickens's criticism of society is almost exclu-
sively moral. Hence the utter lack of any constructive sugges-
tion anywhere in his work. He attacks the law [and other
institutions] ... without ever clearly suggesting what he would
put in their places.... There is no clear sign that he wants
the existing order to be overthrown, or that he believes it
would make very much difference if it were overthrown. For
in reality his target is not so much society as 'human nature.'
... His whole 'message' is one that at first glance looks like an
enormous platitude: If men would behave decently the world
would be decent."
Thus, Dickens's criticisms of law and lawyers should not be con-
strued to define lawyers, as contrasted with other social actors, as
particularly evil. Nor do his criticisms mean that the legal sys-
tem, as contrasted with other social systems, particularly corrupts
those who come into contact with it. Rather, the message is that
the law and lawyers, like other institutions and their keepers, do
not and cannot advance morality and human decency.
III. LAW IN LITERATURE: THE DICKENS NovELs
This article will address Dickens's treatment of law and lawyers
in five of his novels: The Pickwick Papers, David Copperfield, Bleak
House, A Tale of Two Cities, and Great Expectations. These are not
the only Dickens novels that deal with law or lawyers nor, with
the exception of The Pickwick Papers and Bleak House, are they
centrally involved with law or lawyers. However, in each of these
novels, either a lawsuit plays a central role or a lawyer or law
22. EDMUND WILSON, THE WOUND AND THE Bow 28 (1941) (emphasis in original).
23. ORWELL, supra note 19, at 51-52.
19941
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clerk is a principal character. Although this article examines the
significant legal aspects of these novels, no attempt is made to
catalog all legal matters or references to the law or lawyers in
each of these novels.
A. The Pickwick Papers
The Pickwick Papers, originally published as The Posthumous Pa-
pers of The Pickwick Club,24 was the first novel written by the then
24-year-old Charles Dickens. The novel is largely concerned with
the progress of an action for breach of promise of marriage.
Through his depiction of the lawsuit, Dickens highlights the ve-
nality of lawyers and the obstacles that the law imposes on the
efforts of the novel's protagonist to act in a morally decent
fashion.
The Pickwick Papers depicts the picaresque adventures of one
Mr. Samuel Pickwick and his comrades in the Pickwick Club.25
Although the novel contains numerous subplots and other epi-
sodes, the main story involves an apparent misunderstanding be-
tween Mr. Pickwick and his widowed landlady, Mrs. Bardell.
Mrs. Bardell brings an action against Mr. Pickwick for breach of
promise of marriage, seeking damages in the amount of fifteen
hundred pounds as a result of this misunderstanding.
26
The lawsuit, Bardell v. Pickwick, is commenced by the issuance
of a writ of attachment against Pickwick, as was customary under
the procedure at the time .2  Before consulting with his own
counsel, Mr. Perker, Pickwick proceeds to the law offices of Dod-
son and Fogg, counsel for Mrs. Bardell. Dodson is "a plump,
portly, stern-looking man, with a loud voice" and Fogg is a "pim-
ply-faced, vegetable-diet sort of man, in a black coat ... a kind
of being who seemed to be an essential part of the desk at which
he was writing, and to have as much thought or sentiment."
28
24. CHARLES DICKENS, THE POSTHUMOUS PAPERS OF THE PICKWICK CLUB (Robert L.
Patten ed., Penguin Books 1966) (1836-37) [hereinafter DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS].
25. In the first chapter of the novel, Dickens refers to a "Pickwick Club" with of-
ficers and detailed minutes that was founded by Samuel Pickwick. Id. ch. 1. Dickens
soon drops the pretense of a formal club and concentrates exclusively on the adven-
tures of Pickwick and his friends.
26. The particulars of the conversation between Mr. Pickwick and Mrs. Bardell that
led to the lawsuit will be discussed in detail infta Part IV. B.
27. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 18, at 325. A writ of attachment is
a civil document used to enforce a court order or judgment. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY
1443 (5th ed. 1979).
28. Id. ch. 20, at 348.
[Vol. 20
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At these offices, Pickwick learns that earlier that same day
Fogg refused to accept a tender by a certain Ramsey, a debtor
whom Fogg was suing, on the grounds that the tender did not
include certain additional costs required by a declaration pur-
portedly filed by Fogg. As soon as Ramsey leaves Fogg's office in
disgust, Fogg has his clerk quickly go to court to file the not-yet-
filed declaration, explaining that they will recover the additional
costs and that they may as well get what they can out of Ramsey:
"[I] t's a Christian act to do it... for with his large family and
small income, he'll be all the better for a good lesson against
getting into debt."29 Pickwick and the reader infer from the
Ramsey incident that these lawyers are totally lacking in any
sense of ethics and, in fact, are not really human in any recogniz-
able way.
When Dodson and Fogg meet with Pickwick, they advise the
incredulous Pickwick that they are in fact seeking to recover fif-
teen hundred pounds on behalf of their client and proceed to
serve Pickwick with the writ. Pickwick is outraged and calls their
actions "disgraceful and rascally proceedings."3 0 Rather than be-
ing offended by such insults, Dodson and Fogg ensure that their
law clerks have witnessed Pickwick's potentially-libelous remarks.
They go on to suggest that Pickwick might like to call them
"swindlers" or "thieves" or might wish to assault one of them.3
Again, Dodson and Fogg are creatures who would suffer emo-
tional and even physical abuse for the apparent purpose of fo-
menting additional causes of action of their own against
Pickwick. Pickwick avoids further litigation by the vigilance of
his wise valet, Sam Weller, who convinces his master to depart.
Pickwick subsequently is brought by his own lawyer, Mr.
Perker, to meet with his litigator, Serjeant Snubbin. 2 Serjeant
Snubbin responds with indifference to Pickwick and his case, de-
spite Pickwick's principled assertion that he prefers not to be
represented by Serjeant Snubbin unless the Serjeant actually be-
lieves in Pickwick's innocence.3 3
29. Id. ch. 20, at 345.
30. Id. ch. 20, at 350.
31. Id.
32. At the time, Serjeants had the highest rank in the legal profession and had a
monopoly as pleader at the Common Pleas Bar. Therefore, Pickwick (and Mrs.
Bardell) had to retain this particular rank of lawyer to represent them. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 13, at 66-67.
33. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 31, at 518.
1994]
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With more than a touch of irony, the trial gets underway on
February 14, St. Valentine's Day. At the outset, Mr. Perker ex-
plains to Pickwick that the size of the breakfast eaten by the fore-
man of the jury is "highly important," in that a hungry juror
always finds for the plaintiff.14 Dickens, consistent with a theme
that reprises in many of his novels, advises the reader that justice
will have very little to do with the outcome of the trial. The trial
itself proceeds in a very stylized manner and Dickens, through
artful use of irony, satire, and hyperbole, demonstrates that the
trial provides little insight into the true nature of the dispute. 5
Moreover, the testimony elicited and the manner in which the
questions are asked seems calculated to provide as little informa-
tion as possible that would be helpful to a trier of fact.
After a short deliberation, the jury returns with a verdict for
Mrs. Bardell in the amount of seven hundred fifty pounds, plus
probable costs.3 6 Pickwick, and the reader, believe that a total
miscarriage of justice has occurred, and Pickwick announces to
Dodson and Fogg, "not one farthing of costs or damages do you
ever get from me, if I spend the rest of my existence in a debtor's
prison."" Mr. Pickwick is a man of great moral principle, and,
despite his significant personal wealth, he refuses to pay the
judgment. To pay would make him a party to an immoral conse-
quence. As a result, Dodson and Fogg have Pickwick sent to
debtor's prison."
After Dodson and Fogg discover that imprisonment has not
had its intended effect on so principled a man as Mr. Pickwick,
they employ a different tactic. Mrs. Bardell had given Dodson
34. Id. ch. 34, at 552.
35. Neither Mrs. Bardell nor Mr. Pickwick, the parties to the litigation and the two
individuals with the most relevant testimony to provide, testify. Dickens, however, takes
no note of that fact nor the reason for their failure to testify. In fact, under the rules of
that time, any witness with an interest in the outcome of the litigation was barred from
testifying. HouswoRTI, supra note 13, at 132-35. It may be that, given the very exist-
ence of such a rule, the lack of testimony from the parties was not noteworthy. How-
ever, as one not normally reluctant to satirize any aspect of the law, Dickens's silence on
this matter is curious.
36. DIcKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 34, at 576.
37. Id. ch. 34, at 576.
38. Dickens, with his customary inattention to the technical rules of law, does not
explain why Mrs. Bardell was unable to execute upon Samuel Pickwick's considerable
assets nor why Pickwick, an otherwise prosperous merchant, was imprisoned for debt.
In fact, Pickwick apparently held his money in the form of securities, which, at the time,
unlike real estate, could not be executed upon. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 140-43;
POSNER, supra note 9, at 129; William Renwick Riddell, Why Pickwick Was Gaoled, 17 ILL.
L. REv. 14, 20 (1922).
[Vol. 20
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and Fogg a cognovit, or cognovit note," for their costs that she is
unable to pay.' Applying to their own client the same principles
that they employ against opposing parties, Dodson and Fogg
have Mrs. Bardell thrown in the same debtor's prison as
Pickwick.41
Interestingly, Pickwick's attorney, Mr. Perker, is not shocked
at the perfidy of his fellow lawyers. On the contrary, Perker, who
had earlier expressed admiration for Dodson and Fogg's unprin-
cipled trial tactics, 42 now regards them as "the cleverest scamps I
ever had anything to do with." 43 He and his law clerk reflect on
Dodson's and Fogg's tactics as "one of the most beautiful and
ingenious discoveries that the intellect of man had ever made.""
Thus, even though Perker does not engage in conduct as im-
moral as Dodson's and Fogg's, it is not for lack of apparent
desire.
Pickwick, a moral man unlike any of the attorneys, is now
faced with a moral dilemma. Dodson and Fogg are willing to
release the imprisoned Mrs. Bardell, provide a statement absolv-
ing Pickwick, and admit that they had fomented the litigation if
Pickwick will pay their costs of one hundred fifty pounds.4 5 Pick-
wick is forced to compromise his principles and thus agrees to
their terms. When he pays Dodson and Fogg, Pickwick again
tells them that they are "a well-matched pair of mean, rascally,
pettifogging robbers."46 Dodson and Fogg again attempt to in-
39. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 46, at 746. A cognovit is a legal
document similar to a confession which, because it acknowledges costs, enabled Dod-
son and Fogg to proceed summarily without having to sue Mrs. Bardell. Id.
40. Id. ch. 46, at 746. Again, Dickens fails to explain how lawyers retained on con-
tingency can, without first recovering from the defendant, proceed against the plaintiff
for what appears to be largely their own fees.
41. Id. ch. 46, at 746-47.
42. Id. ch. 34, at 556. Perker whispered to Mr. Pickwick, "Capital fellows those Dod-
son and Fogg; excellent ideas of effect, my dear sir. Excellent." Id.
43. Id. ch. 47, at 750.
44. DICKENs, PIcKWItcK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 47, at 751.
45. Id. ch. 47, at 753-54. In his customary disregard for the particulars of the law,
Dickens suggests that Dodson and Fogg conditioned the release of Mrs. Bardell on the
payment of the fees of both counsel for the plaintiff, themselves, and counsel for the
defendant, Mr. Perker. Id. at 753. This is an apparent error by Dickens because the
cognovit would only cover the costs of Mrs. Bardell's own counsel. Thus, Dodson and
Fogg would have no interest in assuring that Pickwick paid his counsel. HOLOSWORTH,
supra note 13, at 149; Riddell, supra note 38, at 24 n.24. In fact, later in the novel,
Pickwick makes separate arrangements for payment of Perker's own fees. DICKENS, PICK-
WICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 53, at 848.
46. Id. ch. 53, at 847.
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duce Pickwick to assault them and threaten additional legal ac-
tion." Despite Perker's earlier prediction that their foul ways
will precipitate their demise,48 by the novel's end Dodson and
Fogg continue to thrive in a very successful practice.49
Throughout The Pickwick Papers, Dickens characterizes all law-
yers as venal, to one degree or another, and portrays a legal pro-
cess that bears no relationship to either justice or morality. In
fact, the law and lawyers of Dickens's world are not simply
amoral, but rather pose positive impediments to true moral ac-
tion. Although the law, as Dickens interprets it, fails to achieve
justice, it is the nonlawyer Pickwick who ultimately achieves ajust
end by compromising his principles to release Mrs. Bardell from
prison. The unselfishness of this act is heightened by the fact
that Mrs. Bardell, who admitted that her lawsuit was baseless,
contributed to Pickwick's unnecessary suffering.
By Dickens's standards, Pickwick's chivalric moral code is far
superior to the illusory moral code of either the lawyers who in-
habit his novels or the law itself. Thus, Dickens advises that so-
cial justice is best served when one remains true to one's moral
self and, like Mr. Pickwick, refuses to acquiesce to the demands
of the legal system.
B. David Copperfield
The Personal History of David Copperfield,5° written in 1849-50, is
the most autobiographical of Dickens's novels. Although it does
not as extensively address lawsuits or legal issues as some of his
other works, the novel does contain well-drawn portraits of law-
yers. Like The Pickwick Papers, the lawyers in David Copperfield are
corrupt or mercenary; even those who demonstrate moral de-
cency at the outset come to embody some of these evils by the
end of the novel.
Like the young Charles Dickens who worked as a court re-
porter at the Doctors' Commons,5 1 David Copperfield is articled
47. Id. ch. 53, at 847-48.
48. Id. ch. 47, at 755.
49. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 57, at 897.
50. CHARLES DICKENS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF DAVID COPPERFIELD (Trevor
Blount ed., Penguin Books 1966) (1849-50) [hereinafter DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD].
51. The Doctors' Commons, established in 1567, had ecclesiastical and admiralty
jurisdiction. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 30. See generally, Daniel R. Coquillette,
Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV- The Nature of Civilian Influence on Modern Anglo-Ameri-
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to the law firm of Spenlow and Jorkins to become an attorney or
"proctor." As David's friend explains:
[Doctors' Commons is] a little out-of-the-way place, where
they administer what is called ecclesiastical law, and play all
kinds of tricks with obsolete old monsters of acts of Parlia-
ment, which three-fourths of the world know nothing about,
and the other fourth supposes to have been dug up, in a fossil
state, in the days of the Edwards.
52
David's employer, Francis Spenlow, dressed like all Dickens's
lawyers in black and stiff like a puppet, relies on his partner, the
allegedly mercenaryJorkins, as his excuse to refuse any exercise
in generosity. 3 David later learns that, in fact, Jorkins is a mild
man whose role in the business "was to keep himself in the back-
ground, and be constantly exhibited by name as the most obdu-
rate and ruthless of men.... The heart and hand of the good
angel Spenlow would have been always open, but for the re-
straining demon Jorkins."54
Spenlow's smugness and his opportunistic view of Doctors'
Commons is consistent with his refusal to take responsibility for
his own lack of generosity. Describing his profession as "the
genteelest profession in the world,"55 Spenlow advises David
that the best sort of professional business is a case of a disputed
will in which a significant estate is at stake:
In such a case, he said, not only were there very pretty pick-
ings, in the way of arguments at every stage of the proceed-
ings, and mountains upon mountains of evidence on
interrogatory and counter-interrogatory... but, the costs be-
ing pretty sure to come out of the estate at last, both sides
went at it in a lively and spirited manner, and expense was no
consideration.56
Spenlow boasts that the Doctors' Commons is "the complete
ideal of smugness," 7 which allows lawyers to engage in pro-
tracted litigation. He concludes that "a man might lay his hand
upon his heart, and say this to the whole world, 'Touch the Com-
can Commercial Law, 67 B.U. L. REV. 877 (1987). DICmS, DAVID COPPERFIELD, supra
note 50, ch. 23 n.1.
52. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD, supra note 50, ch. 23, at 403.
53. IM. ch. 23, at 411.
54. Id ch. 23, at 410-12.
55. Id ch. 26, at 447.
56. Id
57. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFELD, supra note 50, ch. 26, at 448.
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mons, and down comes the country!' "58 Thus, Spenlow even re-
sorts to patriotism to mask his motives and justify his own
venality.
Like Dickens, David Copperfield leaves the legal profession to
become an author and encounters an even more odious mem-
ber of the profession-Uriah Heep. Heep is a red-haired, cadav-
erous-faced youth, with long, clammy, fish-like hands.59 Prior to
his becoming a lawyer, Heep worked as a law clerk for Mr.
Wickfield whose daughter was David's early love interest. Unlike
the boastful Spenlow, Heep is constantly and irritatingly self-dep-
recating or, as he repeatedly says, very "umble." Heep came
from humble origins and studied hard to become a lawyer, but
publicly disavows any implication that he seeks success as one.
David soon realizes that Heep's "umbleness" is merely the "de-
testable cant of false humility."6"
Behind his facade of humility, Heep, who has since become a
lawyer, plots to usurp the weak Mr. Wickfield and take over his
law practice by falsifying documents and embezzling funds.
Heep hopes that his triumph over Mr. Wickfield will enable him
to marry Mr. Wickfield's daughter Agnes.
Heep engages one of the most famous Dickensian characters,
Mr. Micawber, 61 a close friend of David, to carry out his schemes.
Micawber, although chronically insolvent, suffers from un-
founded exuberance and optimism; he is always expecting some-
thing to turn up. But, once he becomes Heep's law clerk,
Micawber becomes secretive and conspiratorial. While due
partly to the fact that Heep has used financial coercion to domi-
nate Micawber, Dickens implies in no small way that this change
in personality was the inevitable result of Micawber's foray into
the law. As Micawber tells David,
The discussion of some topics.., is... incompatible with the
functions now devolving on me. I would therefore take the
liberty of suggesting that in our friendly intercourse .. .we
draw a line. On one side of this line.., is the whole range of
the human intellect, with a trifling exception; on the other, is
58. Id ch. 26, at 448.
59. Id ch. 15, at 275.
60. Id ch. 39, at 639.
61. The Micawber character is believed to be modelled on Dickens's own father.
PAGE, supra note 20, at 166. Micawber was convincingly portrayed by W.C. Fields in the
1930s film adaptation of the novel.
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that exception; that is to say, the affairs of Messrs Wickfield
and Heep, with all belonging and appertaining thereunto.
62
Thus, the law has the effect of twisting even good moral charac-
ter and forcing those who toil therein to split their lives between
the law on one hand and all other human development on the
other.
Micawber ultimately exposes Heep's misconduct and de-
nounces him as "the most consummate Villain that has ever ex-
isted. . ." and as "you HEEP of infamy."63 Peace returns to the
Wickfield household and the novel concludes with David mar-
rying Agnes.
David Copperfield is less concerned with the actual practice of
law than is Pickwick, but nonetheless involves lawyers and law
clerks whose characters indirectly comment on Dickens's view of
the nature of the law. Spenlow, a lawyer in the usual Dickensian
mold, specializes in greed and is proud of it. Uriah Heep is per-
haps more detestable because his villainy is concealed by a false
humility that masquerades as typical lawyer-like modesty. But it
is Micawber, one of Dickens's more likeable characters, who
most poignantly illustrates the gap between law and morality
when he develops a split personality upon entering the legal
profession.
In both The Pickwick Papers and David Copperfield the law ac-
cording to Dickens allows individuals with bad moral characters
to exercise their evil with impunity. Through Micawber in Cop-
perfield, however, Dickens asserts the notion that the law not only
forces its practitioners into a Procrustean bed of secrecy, but
even causes those with moral decency to lead morally-circum-
scribed lives. Thus, Dickens tells us that one can be moral or
one can be a lawyer, but one cannot be both at the same time.
C. Bleak House
Charles Dickens's Bleak House,64 regarded by many as Dick-
ens's greatest novel, is also Dickens's most legal novel. The
novel portrays typical Dickensian lawyers and hangers-on who
are either mercenary or positively evil. In addition, the novel
depicts the devastating effect of a lawsuit on the litigants. Those
62. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD, supra note 50, ch. 39, at 629.
63. Id. ch. 52, at 818-19.
64. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books
1971) (1853) [hereinafter DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE].
19941
15
Wertheim: Law, Literature and Morality in the Novels of Charles Dickens
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
W/LL/AM M/TCHEL LAW REVIEW
who are virtuous are spared the vicissitudes of the litigation and
survive largely intact, but those who are morally weak suffer, con-
sumed in the end by the legal system.
A great part of the novel centers on the great Chancery65 case
of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce and the lawyers and litigants involved in
that proceeding. Although the novel was written in the 1850s,
like many of Dickens's novels it is set in an earlier time, in this
case apparently the 1820s. This device allowed Dickens to depict
abuses in the Chancery practice, many of which already had
been the subject of public outcry and reform by the time the
novel was published.66
The first chapter of Bleak House opens with a lengthy descrip-
tion of the dense London fog which metaphorically envelopes
Chancery. As noted literary critic Edmund Wilson remarked,
"the fog stands for Chancery, and Chancery stands for the whole
web of clotted antiquated institutions in which England stifles
and decays."67 In an allusion to Dante,68 Dickens notes the warn-
ing often given to prospective Chancery suitors: "Suffer any
wrong that can be done you, rather than come here!"69
The case being heard is Jarndyce v. Jarndyce:
This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so
complicated that no man alive knows what it means. The par-
ties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no
two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes with-
out coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. In-
numerable children have been born into the cause;
innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable
old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliri-
ously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have
inherited legendary hatreds with the suit.... [T]here are not
three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom
65. Chancery was an English court that followed different principles than those
governing courts of law and awarded equitable, rather than monetary, remedies. After
the Judicature Acts, the Chancery courts were abolished. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13,
at 114-15, 143-48; POSNER, supra note 9, at 129-30.
66. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 81, 114-15; Boyer, supra note 13, at 596, 622-24.
For example, the requirement of excessive and expensive copying of legal documents
and the requirement that the Lord Chancellor personally review all cases were abol-
ished prior to the publication of Bleak House. POSNER, supra note 9, at 130.
67. WILSON, supra note 22, at 37.
68. "All hope abandon, ye who enter here." DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY,
Canto III, line 9 (1320).
69. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 1, at 51.
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Jarndyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee-house in
Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its
dreary length before the Court, perennially hopeless.
70
Although it has meant death to many, the case itself has become
a joke to the lawyers. In one of his rare depictions of actual
courtroom proceedings, Dickens depicts the presentation of the
lawyer, Mr. Tangle, before the Lord High Chancellor:
"Mlud," says Mr Tangle. Mr Tangle knows more of
Jarndyce and Jarndyce than anybody. He is famous for it-
supposed never to have read anything else since he left
school.
"Have you nearly concluded your argument?"
"Mlud, no-variety of points-feel it my duty tsubmit-lud-
ship," is the reply that slides out of Mr Tangle.
"Several members of the bar are still to be heard, I be-
lieve?" says the Chancellor, with a slight smile.
Eighteen of Mr Tangle's learned friends, each armed with
a little summary of eighteen hundred sheets, bob up like
eighteen hammers in a pianoforte, make eighteen bows, and
drop into their eighteen places of obscurity.
"We will proceed with the hearing on Wednesday fort-
night," says the Chancellor. For the question at issue is only a
question of costs, a mere bud on the forest tree of the parent
suit, and really will come to a settlement one of these days.
71
During the course of the novel and the maddeningly slow pro-
gress of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the reader is introduced to a few of
the lawyers and suitors involved in the case. John Jarndyce, a
middle-aged bachelor and hero of the novel, is a reluctant party
to the litigation. He describes the lawsuit as follows:
"A certain Jarndyce, in an evil hour, made a great fortune,
and made a great Will. In the question how the trusts under
that Will are to be administered, the fortune left by the Will is
squandered away; the legatees under the Will are reduced to
such a miserable condition that they would be sufficiently
punished, if they had committed an enormous crime in hav-
ing money left them; and the Will itself is made a dead let-
70. 1I ch. 1, at 52. In the early days of the Clinton Administration, reporter Mau-
reen Dowd cited this passage suggesting that the problems surrounding attorney gen-
eral nominee Zoe Baird were largely the result of the law's tendency to feed on itself.
Maureen Dowd, A Lauyerly Search for a Good Lauyer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at 8.
Baird withdrew her nomination when it was alleged that she failed to pay social security
taxes for her domestic staff. Id.
71. DIcKENs, BLzAx HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 1, at 53-54.
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ter .... Equity sends questions to Law, Law sends questions
back to Equity;... When my great uncle poor Tom Jarndyce,
began to think of it, it was the beginning of the end!"
72
In contrast, John Jarndyce's lawyer, Mr. Kenge,75 takes pride in
Jarndyce as "one of the greatest Chancery suits known... a mon-
ument of Chancery practice. In which (I would say) every diffi-
culty, every contingency, every masterly fiction, every form of
procedure known in that court, is represented over and over
again?"74
In connection with Jarndyce, Chancery appoints John Jarndyce
as the guardian of orphans Richard Carstone and Ada Clare.
Richard, like John Jarndyce, is a potential beneficiary in the liti-
gation. Richard Carstone ignores John Jarndyce's warnings
about putting too much faith in the Chancery or hope in
Jarndyce. Consequently, Richard is unable to settle on any profes-
sion. His indecisiveness and inability to take responsibility for
choices resembles Chancery itself. Under the corrupting influ-
ence of Chancery, Richard gradually develops a groundless mis-
trust of John Jarndyce.
Richard Carstone's decline is assisted by his solicitor Mr.
Vholes. In contrast to John Jarndyce who symbolizes life, Vholes
signifies death with his black clothes, "his dead glove" and
"something of the Vampire in him."75 He is repeatedly referred
to as a serpent or cannibal gorging himself on Richard Car-
stone. 76 Nevertheless, Vholes is "a very respectable man"
77
whose greed is justified by the demands of his three daughters
and father who are dependent upon him. Vholes's apparent
72. Id. ch. 8, at 145-46. Although John Jarndyce refers to "a Will, and the trusts
under a Will," another of the litigants, Richard Carstone, and his solicitor later refer to
there being more than one Jarndyce will in dispute. Id. ch. 37, at 582 & ch. 60, at 877.
If, in fact, there were more than one will, it is likely that the matter would have stayed in
Probate until the true will was admitted and would not have even been heard in Chan-
cery until that will was probated. Boyer, supra note 13, at 621. Again, Dickens turns a
blind eye to lawyerly technicalities.
73. Mr. Kenge is called "Conversation Kenge" because he "appeared to enjoy be-
yond everything the sound of his own voice." Id. ch. 3, at 69.
74. Id. ch. 3, at 68. Another character, Sir Leicester Dedlock, as his name suggests,
has no objection to an interminable Chancery suit since "[i]t is a slow, expensive, Brit-
ish, constitutional kind of thing." Id., ch. 2, at 60. Thus, the immorality of Chancery is
rationalized on the grounds that England deserves a ponderous legal system.
75. Id. ch. 44, at 673.
76. DICKENs, BLEaK HousE, supra note 64, ch. 39, at 607; ch. 60, at 876; ch. 65, at
924.
77. Id. ch. 39, at 603.
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normality allows Dickens to announce that, "The one great prin-
ciple of the English law is, to make business for itself."78 Conver-
sation Kenge, like Spenlow in David Copperfield, defends lawyers
such as Vholes as being essential to the law and the entire Eng-
lish social system. Dickens equates that argument to one that
says: "Make man-eating unlawful, and you starve the Vholeses!"
79
One of the lesser characters on the periphery of Jarndyce is
William Guppy, first a law clerk and later a lawyer in the office of
Mr. Kenge. Guppy unsuccessfully proposes marriage to Esther
Summerson, a narrator of the novel and love interest of John
Jarndyce, as if he were negotiating a contract for the purchase of
hogs:
"What follows is without -prejudice, miss?" said Mr.
Guppy....
"I don't understand what you mean," said I, wondering.
"It's one of our law terms, miss. You won't make any use of
it to my detriment, at Kenge and Carboy's, or elsewhere. If
our conversation shouldn't lead to anything, I am to be as I
was, and am not to be prejudiced in my situation or worldly
prospects. In short, it's in total confidence....
[Guppy recounts to Esther his current salary and prospects,
his mother and her modest annuity, and his own abode. He
then continues,] "Miss Summerson! In the mildest language,
I adore you. Would you be so kind as to allow me (as I may
say) to file a declaration-to make an offer!" °
Guppy's use of legal jargon suggests that lawyers, accustomed to
speaking in legal settings, project a model of court procedure on
the world at large and impose these same patterns of speech
onto situations where they do not fit. Thus, attorneys make the
world conform to their standards of how society should
operate.81
78. Id.
79. I. ch. 39, at 604-05. Dickens portrays Vholes, who defers to his clients' desires
and interests and avoids giving hope of a favorable outcome, as the very model of pro-
fessional conduct. Id., ch. 37, at 590; ch. 39, at 607-11; ch. 60, at 877. Dickens suggests
that otherwise highly estimable moral virtues, such as unquestioning service to a client,
become a mask for self-interest in the legal system.
80. Id. ch. 9, at 174-75. Guppy's proposal resembles a recent New Yorker cartoon in
which a young couple is having a romantic dinner and the man, holding up some pa-
pers, says, "I love you, Sharon, and these documents will advise you of certain rights you
have in accordance with federal and state law, as well as variances and privileges you
retain in the City of New York." NEw YORKER, Feb. 1, 1993, at 83.
81. David Morgan, Nowhere to Hide: A Lawyer Faces His Nemesis in "Cape Fear", 78
A.B.A.J. 50, 52 (Feb. 1992). This tendency is also exemplified by the recent story of a
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Another peripheral character, Jo, is a friendless crossing
sweeper who lives in Tom-All-Alone's, a slum that fell into decay
while having been tied-up in Jarndyce. Jo transmits smallpox
from the slum to Esther Summerson, a symbol of the corruption
Chancery has wrought. Lastly, there is Krook, who keeps a junk
shop near Chancery and is nicknamed "the Lord Chancellor."
Krook dies of spontaneous combustion, a metaphor for Dick-
ens's desire for the destruction of the evils represented by
Chancery.82
A separate plot in Bleak House involves the aristocratic Sir
Leicester Dedlock, his wife Lady Dedlock, and Sir Leicester's at-
torney, Mr. Tulkinghorn. Mr. Tulkinghorn, Dickens's most elite
lawyer, is a bachelor and a lawyer "of what is called the old
school.""3 More specifically, he is "an unopenable Oyster of the
old school,""4 the keeper of family secrets who "never converses,
when not professionally consulted." 5
Lady Dedlock has a tangential interest in Jarndyce and, in the
course of his representing her, Tulkinghorn stumbles upon and
relentlessly pursues a secret scandal involving her past. During a
later confrontation between the two of them, Lady Dedlock re-
fers to "my secret."" Tulkinghorn corrects her and explains that
the secret is no longer just her secret, but also is "my secret, in
trust for Sir Leicester and the family."87 Tulkinghorn's quest to
uncover her secret leads to Lady Dedlock's death and ultimately
his own.
One of the significant interpretive problems in Bleak House is
the explanation of Tulkinghorn's motive for pursuing Lady
Dedlock's secret. Because Sir Leicester does not ask
Tulkinghorn to pursue this matter, and, in fact, is unaware of his
actions until it is too late, one must consider whether pursuing
Lady Dedlock and revealing her secret serves any of his client's
needs. Alternatively, one can question whether Tulkinghorn
lawyer who sued his former fiance6 for some $40,000 that he spent wooing her. David
Margolick, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at B1.
82. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 32, at 511-12.
83. Id. ch. 2, at 58.
84. Id ch. 10, at 184. Dickens used similar language in characterizing what is prob-
ably his most famous creation, Ebenezer Scrooge, whom he called "secret, and self-
contained, and solitary as an oyster...." CHARLES DICKENS, A CHIumSmAs CAROL ch. 14
(Michael P. Hearn, ed., 1976) (1843).
85. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 2, at 59; ch. 10, at 182, 184.
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serves any professional interest or obligation of his own in his
quest for her secret.
Lady Dedlock suggests that Tulkinghorn's actions are ex-
plained by the fact that he is "mechanically faithful without at-
tachment" to Sir Leicester and that he is "indifferent to
everything but his calling," which is the acquisition of secrets.88
This implies that Tulkinghorn is completely a creature of his
legal profession. Investigation of his wife's past indiscretions,
however, was not likely to serve Sir Leicester; in fact, conceal-
ment was more likely to benefit him. Tulkinghorn admits even
to himself that if the secret were disclosed, Sir Leicester would
nonetheless remain with his wife and suffer personally as a re-
sult.89 That is precisely what does happen after Sir Leicester dis-
covers the truth.
It is difficult to fathom the motive for Tulkinghorn's preoccu-
pation with Lady Dedlock's secret, particularly in light of his re-
luctance to disclose his discovery to Sir Leicester. Some
commentators contend that the motive is misogyny-
Tulkinghorn's hatred of women in general, and Lady Dedlock in
particular.9 0 Other critics have explained Tulkinghorn's behav-
ior simply as his being a morally evil person.91 In this view,
Tulkinghorn's conduct is unjustified because it is neither attrib-
utable to his legal calling nor his professional obligations to Sir
Leicester.92 One might argue, however, that although his obses-
88. I& ch. 36, at 567.
89. Id. ch. 41, at 636.
90. WEISBERG, supra note 9, at 70-72. See DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch.
16, at 276. "There are women enough in the world, Mr. Tulkinghorn thinks-too many;
they are at the bottom of all that goes wrong in it, though, for the matter of that, they
create business for lawyers." Id, ch. 29, at 276. See also id., ch. 29, at 457; ch. 41, at 637;
ch. 42, at 642; Jeremy Hawthorn, BLEAK HOUSE 43, 78-79 (1987).
91. A.E. DYSON, DICKENS BLEAK HOUSE: A CASEBOOK 242, 252-54 (1969) (suggesting
that Tulkinghorn's lack of clear motivation is evidence of his incarnate evil); Hawthorn,
supra note 90, at 42, 79.
92. Tulkinghorn uncovers the initial clue to Lady Dedlock's past during a conversa-
tion that took place as part of his representation related to Jarndyce. Lady Dedlock
expresses unexpected distress while she examines the handwriting of an unknown law-
writer. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 2, at 61-62. Although Tulkinghorn
does not directly disclose Lady Dedlock's secret to anyone, not even his primary client,
Sir Leicester, he does use his knowledge to harass and oppress Lady Dedlock. Arguably,
the distress she showed was a privileged attorney-client communication or information
obtained as a result of a privileged communication, which Tulkinghorn was ethically
barred from using in any manner adverse to Lady Dedlock. Thus, his entire investiga-
tion breached his ethical obligation to Lady Dedlock. Throughout the novel, however,
Tulkinghorn acts as if his sole client was Sir Leicester and his ancestral family.
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sion with Lady Dedlock's secret is not strictly part of his profes-
sional obligations, his compulsive tendency to track down every
last piece of a puzzle without regard to consequences-either to
the lawyer or client-is simply behavior that all too commonly
occurs within the profession.
Returning to the novel's other plot, Jarndyce vs. Jarndyce finally
wends its way to conclusion. Richard Carstone, now under the
influence of Vholes, is slowly consumed by the litigation. As he
physically declines, Carstone becomes convinced that his bene-
factor, John Jarndyce, is an enemy to his interests. Like many
litigants, Carstone suspiciously reasons that because he himself is
tainted by the litigation, JohnJarndyce is also tainted by it. Car-
stone concludes that his benefactor's indifference to the litiga-
tion is merely an effort to induce others, himself in particular, to
refrain from protecting their rights.
A new Jarndyce will is then discovered which, if accepted,
promises to end the lawsuit favorably for Carstone. When
Jarndyce next comes before the court, however, the validity of the
new will becomes moot because, to the great merriment of the
bar, the litigants learn that the estate has been entirely eaten up
in costs. As Vholes leaves Richard, he gives "another gasp as if
he had swallowed the last morsel of his client."9 Like Krook,
"the Lord Chancellor" who earlier fell a victim of Spontaneous
Combustion, Carstone dies of consumption-consumed by
Chancery.94 Despite the devastation this case has wreaked, Dick-
ens titles the chapter reporting the end of Jarndyce the "Begin-
ning the World."9" Only after the useless litigation has ended,
and taken its toll on the innocent litigants and some of the not
so innocent hangers-on, can the real business of the world-
leading morally decent lives-begin.
The Jarndyce case represents Dickens's most sustained attack
on lawyers and the legal system. Interestingly, unlike his ap-
proach to Pickwick v. Bardell, Dickens does not point to any incor-
rect ruling in Jarndyce which is fatal to justice, but rather blames
93. Id ch. 65, at 924. Even Conversation Kenge is unrepentant regarding this
"Monument of Chancery practice." Id. "If the public have the benefit, and if the coun-
try have the adornment, of this great Grasp, it must be paid for in money or money's
worth, sir." Id., ch. 65, at 923.
94. Earlier, a character remarks about Richard that "there's combustion going on
here! It's not a case of Spontaneous, but it's smoldering combustion it is." Id. ch. 39, at
612.
95. Id ch. 65.
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the unfortunate result on Chancery's inability to make any rul-
ing, right or wrong.
Dickens's view of the legal system is not without redeeming
qualities; neither does he fault lawyers for all the law's shortcom-
ings. Dickens recognizes, for example, that protracted litigation
frequently is the result of a client's unwillingness to settle.
In another of several subplots, Sir Leicester and Lawrence
Boythorn, a friend of John Jarndyce, are embroiled in suits and
countersuits for trespass over a right-of-way between their adjoin-
ing properties. Both Sir Leicester and the otherwise gentle
Boythorn become apoplectic about each other. They wage a
running battle of assaults, batteries and lawsuits against each
other. At one point, Tulkinghorn endeavors to resolve the dis-
pute by compromise and approaches Sir Leicester:
"The only question is," pursues [Tulkinghorn], "whether
you will give up anything."
"No, sir," replies Sir Leicester. "Nothing. I give up?"
"I don't mean anything of importance. That, of course, I
know you would not abandon. I mean any minor point."
"Mr Tulkinghorn," returns Sir Leicester, "there can be no
minor point between myself and Mr Boythorn. If I go farther,
and observe that I cannot readily conceive how any right of
mine can be a minor point, I speak not so much in reference
to myself as an individual, as in reference to the family posi-
tion I have it in charge to maintain."
Mr Tulkinghorn inclines his head again. "I have now my
instructions," he says. "Mr Boythorn will give us a good deal
of trouble-"
96
Sir Leicester cuts off Tulkinghorn with a reminder that in previ-
ous times a "levelling person" such as Boythorn would have been
tried, convicted and hung.97
Although Dickens acknowledges that intractable clients often
are most guilty of perpetuating litigation,98 he also recognizes
that litigation satisfies a societal need, at least in the contexts of
social discourse and conflict resolution. As the novel ends, Sir
Leicester and Boythom continue to wage their legal warfare.
Despite their common suffering (Leicester has lost Lady
96. Id ch. 12, at 214.
97. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 64, ch. 12, at 214.
98. Vholes's willingness to be an instrument for Richard Carstone's paranoia and
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Dedlock and, as a youth, Boythorn was romantically rejected by
Lady Dedlock's sister), they are unable to communicate with one
another except through their litigation. "So the quarrel goes on
to the satisfaction of both."99
Nevertheless, although Dickens concedes law's modest social
utility, the law and lawyers of Bleak House largely hinder the ef-
forts of those attempting to lead virtuous lives. Like Pickwick,
the morally strong John Jarndyce remains true to his moral self
only by ignoring the lawsuit. Conversely, by accepting the prem-
ises-and the promises-of the law, the morally weak, like Rich-
ard Carstone, are destroyed. Parasitic lawyers like Vholes and, to
a lesser extent, Kenge are permitted to indulge their rapacity.
Even highly respected lawyers such as Tulkinghorn are free to
pervert their calling. And the less amoral or greedy, like Guppy,
stand to lose their ability to communicate even their passion
once constrained by the practice of law.
Like Dickens's portrayal of the legal profession, Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce feeds upon itself. Only when Chancery is metaphorically
destroyed after the case consumes itself can the rest of the world
begin to lead morally responsible lives.
D. A Tale of Two Cities
Dickens's A Tale of Two Cities,100 although essentially con-
cerned with the French Revolution, involves two trials and two
lawyers. The trials, like the one in The Pickwick Papers, have little
connection to truth or justice, and the lawyers are virtuous only
to the extent that they reject the traditional roles of their
profession.
One lawyer is the bullying Mr. Stryver, a minor character who,
as his name implies, is a grasping careerist. The other lawyer, his
associate Sydney Carton, is one of the novel's protagonists. We
meet both lawyers at the beginning of the novel as they defend
Charles Darnay, a French aristocrat who has renounced his title
and who is being unjustly tried for treason at The Old Bailey in
1780. The trial consists largely of posturing by the prosecuting
attorney and the obviously perjured, but effective, testimony of
paid informers who identify Darnay as a traitor. Carton, who
does little to mask his boredom during the proceedings, inter-
99. Id ch. 66, at 929.
100. CHARL.Es DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES (George Woodcock ed., Penguin
Books 1970) (1859) [hereinafter DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CrES].
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rupts Stryver's desultory cross-examination of a government wit-
ness by tossing him a note. At Carton's direction, Stryver points
to the uncanny resemblance between Carton and the defendant,
thereby impeaching the witness's identification. Carton lapses
back into boredom except to notice the presence of Lucie
Manette, a witness for Darnay. Darnay is acquitted as a result of
Carton's insight and quick thinking.
Stryver is yet another of Dickens's overbearing and greedy, but
not very talented, lawyers. The mysterious Sydney Carton, on
the other hand, is different. The "idlest and most unpromising
of men," Carton is Stryver's "great ally" and is referred to by
Dickens as "the jackal" for his services to Stryver.' 0' Just as Mi-
cawber was used by Uriah Heep in David Copperfield, so is Sydney
Carton used by Stryver. Although the source of his moroseness
and apathy is never expressly identified, Carton, like Richard
Carstone in Bleak House, is dissipating his life in the law by lack of
purpose. In Carton's case, his dissipation is aided by drink. An-
other character, remarking on Carton's disreputable look, says,
"I'd hold half a guinea that he don't get no law-work to do.
Don't look like the sort of one to get any, do he?"'0 2 Given Dick-
ens's customary hostility to law-work, this is high praise masquer-
ading as criticism.
Both Stryver and Carton are romantically attracted to Lucie
Manette. Stryver is quickly rejected largely because he is a boor.
Although Lucie is attracted to Sydney Carton, she is committed
to Charles Darnay. Carton is torn between his respect and love
for Lucie and his hatred for his rival, Darnay, whom Lucie
marries.
After the outbreak of the French Revolution, Charles Darnay
is tried by the Terror'05 for the crimes of his aristocratic relatives
whose titles he had previously renounced. The French revolu-
tionary court convicts Darnay and sentences him to death. Syd-
ney Carton, acting out of his unselfish love for Lucie and a
desire to give meaning to his life, saves Darnay from the guillo-
tine. Capitalizing again on his physical resemblance to his rival,
Carton goes to the scaffold in Darnay's place in a Christ-like act
101. Id. Bk.II, ch. 5, at 117.
102. Id. Bk.II, ch. 3, at 107.
103. The Reign of Terror was the mechanism by which the revolutionary govern-
ment sought in 1793 to eliminate its enemies by means of execution. See generally THE
COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 766, 767 (1987).
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of purposefulness and resurrection. The novel concludes with
Carton's stirringly melodramatic declaration, perhaps the most
famous lines in Dickens:
"It is a far, far better thing that I do, than I have ever done; it
is a far, far better rest that I go to than I have ever known."104
The gap between law and morality is never so powerfully de-
picted as it is in A Tale of Two Cities. Sydney Carton epitomizes
the futility of the legal system. If what poses as justice can be
meted out as arbitrarily as it was to be at Darnay's first trial, why
should Carton-or anyone else, for that matter-take any real
interest in the law. 105 By the novel's end, however, Carton's dis-
sipation is replaced by the high moral character that Dickens
extols as society's salvation.
Of all the lawyers that populate his novels, Carton is clearly
Dickens's most favored, but only because Carton possesses none
of the attributes one would expect of a "good" lawyer in the typi-
cal Dickensian mold. More important, however, is the fact that
Carton commits the most unselfish-and least lawyerlike-
moral act possible: by sacrificing himself he achieves for Darnay
the justice that eluded him in the courts.
E. Great Expectations
Charles Dickens's Great Expectations °6 is of particular interest
in the present context. Through his portrayals of Mr. Jaggers,
one of his more realistic lawyers, and Jaggers's law clerk, Wem-
mick, Dickens effectively reiterates the dichotomy between virtue
and the law.
Jaggers, a cynical, bullying lawyer, is hired by an undisclosed
benefactor to administer funds for Pip, the novel's hero. Jag-
gers, a very successful criminal lawyer, suffers the compulsive
habit of vigorously washing his hands with scented soap after
each encounter with a client, likely symbolizing his distaste for
his clients' filthy lives or the filthy acts he must perform as their
lawyer. Jaggers is adversarial in all of his relationships. While
dining with Jaggers, Pip notices that "[h]e cross-examined his
very wine when he had nothing else in hand ... and cross-ex-
104. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CrIES, supra note 100, Bk.III, ch. 15, at 404.
105. RUTH GLANCY, A TALE OF Two CrrIEs: DICKENS'S REVOLUTIONARY NOVEL 81
(1991).
106. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPEcrATIONS (Angus Calder ed., Penguin Books
1965) (1861) [hereinafter DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS].
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amined the glass again, until I was as nervous as if I had known
the wine to be telling him something to my disadvantage.
" 10 7
When Jaggers comes to a country inn to first advise Pip of his
"great expectations," Mr. Wopsle, the parish clerk, is relating a
newspaper account of a murder trial to Pip and Pip's brother-in-
law and friend, Joe Gargery. Jaggers cannily avoids offering his
opinion of the accused's guilt while pressing Pip and Wopsle for
their view. Once they commit, Jaggers continues,
"But now I'll ask you a question. Do you know, or do you not
know, that the law of England supposes every man to be inno-
cent, until he is proved-proved-to be guilty?"
"Sir," Mr Wopsle began to reply, "as an Englishman myself,
I_"
"Come!" said the stranger, biting his forefinger at him.
"Don't evade the question. Either you know it, or you don't
know it. Which is it to be?"
"Now!" said he. "Do you know it, or don't you know it?"
"Certainly I know it," replied Mr Wopsle.
"Certainly you know it. Then why didn't you say so at first?
Now, I'll ask you another question;" taking possession of Mr
Wopsle, as if he had a right to him. "Do you know that none
of these witnesses have yet been cross-examined?"
Mr Wopsle was beginning, "I can only say-" when the
stranger stopped him.
"What? You won't answer the question, yes or no? Now, I'll
try you again." Throwing his finger at him again. [sic] "Attend
to me. Are you aware, or are you not aware, that none of
these witnesses have yet been cross-examined? Come, I only
want one word from you. Yes, or no?"
Mr. Wopsle hesitated, and we all began to conceive rather a
poor opinion of him.
[Jaggers then gets Wopsle to admit that the newspaper ac-
knowledged that the defendant had reserved its defense.]
• . . "And now I ask you what you say to the conscience of
that man who, with that passage before his eyes, can lay his
head upon his pillow after having pronounced a fellow-crea-
ture guilty, unheard?"
107. Id ch. 29, at 263-64.
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We all began to suspect that Mr. Wopsle was not the man
we had thought him, and that he was beginning to be found
out. 108
One commentator has cited this passage as evidence of Jag-
gers's noble, albeit bullying, defense of the "superb tradition" of
the presumption of innocence in the "moot court" of a country
inn.10 9 It is noteworthy, however, that by the time he wrote Great
Expectations, Dickens was impatient with the niceties of English
criminal procedure such as the criminal's rights against self-
incrimination. °10
Dickens apparently is lambasting a more important target
than Pip's and Wopsle's ignorance of this cherished English
value. Dickens raises the defense of the presumption of inno-
cence in the context ofJaggers's brutal and excessive cross-exam-
ination. This suggests that Jaggers's use of the "presumption of
innocence" as a means of humiliating Wopsle is representative of
lawyers' use of principles to hide immoral acts. Thus, even
meaningful principles become distorted because lawyers are un-
able to resist using adversarial skills to dominate the rest of soci-
ety. Like Tulkinghorn's compulsive search for answers in Bleak
House, Jaggers's lawyerly habit of contentiousness distorts the
otherwise noble principles of his profession.
Jaggers then explains to Pip and Joe the nature of Pip's "great
expectations" and he asks if Joe would be willing to release Pip
from his indenture as an apprentice blacksmith. Joe, happy for
Pip's good fortune, agrees to unconditionally release him. Jag-
gers repeatedly raises the question of whether Joe will require
"compensation" for his release of Pip. Joe replies that Pip is free
to seek his fortune and acknowledges that money could not com-
pensate Joe "for the loss of the little child-what come to the
forge-and ever the best of friends!""' Jaggers responds:
"Now, Joseph Gargery, I warn you this is your last chance.
No half measures with me. If you mean to take a present that
I have it in charge to make to you, speak out, and you shall
have it. If on the contrary you mean to say-" Here, to his
great amazement, he was stopped by Joe's suddenly working
round him with every demonstration of a fell pugilistic
purpose.
108. I& ch. 18, at 160-62.
109. WEISBERG, supra note 9, at 62-63.
110. PHILIP COLLINS, DICKENS AND CRIME 190 (1962).
111. DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS, supra note 106, ch. 18, at 168.
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"Which I meantersay," cried Joe, "that if you come into my
place bull-baiting and badgering me, come out! Which I
meantersay as sech if you're a man, come on! Which I
meantersay that what I say, I meantersay and stand or fall
by!""
1 2
Jaggers suspects that Joe is seeking to establish grounds for a
later claim. Joe, to the contrary, interpretsJaggers's probing as a
challenge to the sincerity of Joe's expressed beliefs about Pip.
This confrontation symbolizes the clash between the cynical
viewpoint of the lawyer Jaggers-who believes that everyone has
his price" 3 and is capable of verbal deception-and the moral
decency of the inarticulate Joe who says what he means and
means what he says.
Jaggers deals in secrets as did Tulkinghorn in Bleak House;,"4
unlike Tulkinghorn, however, Jaggers is loath to know of things
he does not wish to know. When Pip attempts to tell about his
knowledge of his benefactor, Jaggers instructs Pip, "Don't tell
me anything: I don't want to know anything: I am not curi-
ous."" 5 Jagger's refusal to know reflects his lawyerly reluctance
to be incriminated by knowledge of and failure to report the
presence of Pip's benefactor, a transported convict who has re-
turned to England.
Jaggers steadfastly refuses to flatly admit or confirm the true
facts regarding the less incriminating matter of the parentage of
Estelle, Pip's love-hate interest. As he tells Pip, "I'll put a case to
you. Mind! I admit nothing."" 6 Jaggers proceeds to recount
Estelle's parentage as an "imaginary" case and prefaces virtually
every sentence with the phrase "Put the case that... "17 At one
point in the conversation, Pip acknowledges Jaggers's assertion
by stating "I understand you perfectly.""' Jaggers is quick to
modify that understanding by reminding Pip that "I make no
admissions."" 9 Jaggers's unwillingness to disclose secrets even
when disclosure may be prudent reflects his need to preserve
112. Id ch. 18, at 168-69.
113. Stanley Tick, Toward Jaggers, 5 DICKENS STUDIES ANNUAL 133, 144 (1976).
114. DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS, supra note 106, ch. 33, at 289. "Mr. Jaggers,"
said [Pip], "... . has the reputation of being more in the secrets of that dismal place than
any man in London." Id., ch. 33, at 289.
115. Id ch. 40, at 350.
116. Id. ch. 51, at 424.
117. Id ch. 51, at 424-25.
118. Id ch. 51, at 425.
119. DICKENS, GRYAT EXPECTATIONS, supra note 106, ch. 51, at 425.
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lawyerly "deniability" by speaking in the form of thinly-veiled
hypotheticals.
120
Wemmick, a purely business-minded man, works as Jaggers's
law clerk. He repeatedly gives Pip advice about getting ahead
and stresses the importance that Pip "[g]et hold of portable
property."12' However, Wemmick, like Micawber in David COP-
perfield, epitomizes the split-personality that many lawyers de-
velop, a fact he acknowledges by stating that "the office is one
thing, and private life is another."12 2 For example, when Pip in-
quires at the office whether he should give five hundred pounds
to help his best friend, Herbert Pocket, Wemmick tells Pip that
he could more profitably "pitch your money into the
Thames."123 Yet, when the same proposal comes up at Wem-
mick's home, Wemmick tells Pip, "This is devilishly good of
you. "12 4 Wemmick's and Micawber's double lives-one part in
law and the other in moral decency-are the best that a lawyer
can achieve in Dickens's view of the world (short of the ultimate
sacrifices of a Sidney Carton). 25
Although the wheels of justice are not so positively impeded
by lawyers and the law in Great Expectations as they are in his pre-
ceding novels, Dickens nonetheless asserts his view that the law
dehumanizes, if not outrightly corrupts, those who embrace it.
Jaggers is a lawyer par excellence whose lawyerly habits of excessive
advocacy, cynicism, secretiveness, and lack of curiosity mark him
as a man who, while not as venal as Dickens's other lawyers, is
not really human. Wemmick, like Micawber, symbolizes the split
that occurs in moral people who must live part of their lives in
the morally-circumscribed world of the law.
In the novels that have been examined, Dickens's lawyers
range from the more or less evil (Tulkinghorn, Vholes, Uriah
120. Weisberg's generally favorable assessment of Jaggers is certainly an arguable
position. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Edmund Wilson has contrasted
Vholes, "an affable lawyer who is really unscrupulous," with Jaggers, "a kindly lawyer
who pretends to be unfeeling." WILSON, supra note 22, at 64. However, it is difficult
finding the supposed kindness behind Jaggers's impressive pretense.
121. DICKENs, GREAT EXPECrATIONS, supra note 106, ch. 24, at 224.
122. Id. ch. 25, at 231.
123. Id ch. 36, at 310.
124. Id ch. 37, at 314.
125. Unlike lawyers such as Guppy in Bleak House who have lost the capacity to differ-
entiate between law and real life, Wemmick and Micawber know that there is a differ-
ence, powerless as they may be to bridge the gap. However, at least one commentator
regards Wemmick's double life as a sham that masks his true venality. See BERT G. HoRN-
BACK, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: A NOVEL OF FRIENDSHIP 50-52, 80 (1987).
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Heep, Dodson, and Fogg), to the mere careerist (Stryver,
Spenlow, Kenge, Perker, Guppy, and Jaggers), to those who
manage to maintain some virtue by a form of professional schiz-
ophrenia (Micawber and Wemmick), and, finally, to those who
must give up law (David Copperfield) or even their life (Sidney
Carton) to achieve true virtue. As to the clients who come into
contact with the law, those who, like Thoreau, passively resist the
blandishments and enticements of the law (Pickwick and John
Jarndyce) will retain and even enhance their virtue, while those
who succumb to the lure of litigation (Richard Carstone and
Mrs. Bardell) will suffer greatly as a result. Thus, in Dickens's
eyes, virtue and morality are not advanced by the law and, in
fact, worsen as a consequence.
IV. LAW As LiTERATuRE: STANLEY FISH AND THE PICKWICK
PAPERS
The previous section dealt with lawyers and the law in the
novels of Charles Dickens. This section analyzes some of the
legal texts in one of these novels, The Pickwick Papers, by applying
the current literary theory of Stanley Fish.
A. Stanley Fish
Stanley Fish126 has written extensively on literary theory and,
to a lesser extent, the use of literary theories in analyzing legal
texts.12 7 Fish generally belongs to the reader-response and
deconstructionist schools of literary theory.12 What follows is a
brief and admittedly uncritical exposition of some of Fish's theo-
ries and a consideration of some of those theories in the context
of The Pickwick Papers.
126. Before turning his skills to law, Fish was (and continues to be) a noted literary
critic. SeeJOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 116 (1989) (discussing Fish's work
as a literary critic). As a leading scholar of the English Renaissance, Fish's earlier work
focused primarily on 17th-century English poetry. See gmrally STANLEY E. FISH, SUR-
PRISED BY SIN: THE ROLE OF THE READER IN PARADISE LOST (1967).
127. See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) [hereinafter FISH, TEXT]; STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY-. CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES (1989) [hereinafter FISH, NATURALLY]; STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH
THING AS FREE SPEECH . .. AND IT'S A GOOD THING (1994).
128. As broad overgeneralizations, reader-response theory looks at how literary
works are received by the reader or "what a text does" and deconstructionism explores
the indeterminacy of texts and how a text tends to dismantle itself. FISH, TEXT, supra
note 127, at 3.
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Fish argues that literary and legal texts are never determinate
in the sense that there is always, or ever, one constant, certain,
and correct meaning for any particular text. 1 9 Rather, Fish ar-
gues that all meaning, even if understood by the reader or
hearer as the unambiguous, literal meaning, is obtained by inter-
pretation which, in turn, is constrained by the reader's or
hearer's "interpretative community.""' As Fish argues:
[T] here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal mean-
ing one means a meaning that is perspicuous no matter what
the context and no matter what is in the speaker's or hearer's
mind, a meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can
serve as a constraint on interpretation.
1 3
1
According to Fish, meaning can only be found in the reader's
interpretation of the text. That reading, however, is not subjec-
tive because it is constrained by the interpretative assumptions of
the reader's interpretative community.
In other words, Fish contends that no text merely "means"
what it "says," but rather each reader believes in a particular
meaning on the basis of the interpretative assumptions the
reader brings to the text. We only know what the text says be-
cause we believe in our interpretation. Thus, when reading a
text we are only "doing what comes naturally."" 2 Fish provides
an amusing anecdote to illustrate his theory:
As a frequent flyer, I have been amused by the efforts of air-
lines to police their lavatories. In particular, I've noticed the
now almost desperate search for a sign whose wording will
make absolutely and explicitly clear what should and should
not be flushed down the toilet. The latest (and doomed) ef-
fort goes something like this: "Only toilet paper and tissue
should be deposited in the toilet." How long will it be, I won-
der, before flight attendants and maintenance [persons] be-
gin to find bodily waste, liquid and solid, deposited in the
most inconvenient places, if only by wags who recognize and
testify to the folly of thinking that language can be made so
explicit as to preclude interpretation. Of course, one could
add feces and urine to the list of proper things to deposit, but
that would only fuel the game, not stop it. What stops the
game when it is stopped (as it almost always is) is not the ex-
plicitness of words, but the tacit assumptions (concerning
129. FISH, TEXT, supra note 127, at 303-21.
130. Id, at 322.
131. Id, at 4.
132. Id, at 302.
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what toilets are for, and, on an even more basic level, what is
and is not waste in a post-agricultural society) within which
the words immediately take on an unproblematic (though in-
terpretively produced) shape.1
3 3
Neither, asserts Fish, does the intent of a text constrain inter-
pretation. Intent is just another name for interpretation:
There is only one way to read or interpret, and that is... [by]
intention. But to read intentionally is not to be constrained
relative to some other (nonexistent) way of reading ...
Words are intelligible only within the . . . context of inten-
tional production [i.e. a set of interpretative assumptions],
some... [prejudgment] as to what kind of person, with what
kind of purposes, in relation to what specific goals in a partic-
ular situation, is speaking or writing .... In those cases in
which meanings seem immediately available without recourse
to anything but the words themselves [the common sense
meaning], it is because the intentional structure-the... [as-
sumptions] that limit the meanings words can have before
they are produced-is so deeply in place that we are not
aware of it and seem to experience its effects directly .... 1
3 4
Fish finally contends that a standard of truth is never available
independent of a set of beliefs. That "does not mean that we can
never know for certain what is true but that we always know for
certain what is true (because we are always in the grip of some
belief or other [interpretative assumptions]), even though what
we certainly know may change if and when our beliefs
change."
35
B. The Pickwick Papers
With that modest introduction to Stanley Fish, this article will
apply his theories to certain legal texts in The Pickwick Papers.
The outcome of this analysis supports Fish's theories as well as
Dickens's proposition that the law is not a very effective tool for
realizing morality and moral goals.
As discussed above, much of The Pickwick Papers is devoted to
the suit by Mrs. Bardell, Samuel Pickwick's landlady, against Mr.
Pickwick for breach of promise of marriage. Mr. Pickwick's
apartments are in the house of Mrs. Bardell, a widow, who lives
there with her young son. On the day in question, Mr. Pickwick
133. Id, at 302.
134. FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 127, at 295 (emphasis omitted).
135. FIsH, TEXT, supra note 127, at 365 (emphasis in original).
19941
33
Wertheim: Law, Literature and Morality in the Novels of Charles Dickens
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILL/AM MITCHELL LAW REVZEW
is pacing about with a great deal of obvious impatience, while
Mrs. Bardell is dusting the apartment. The following conversa-
tion then occurs:
"Mrs. Bardell," said Mr Pickwick, ....
"Sir," said Mrs. Bardell.
"Your little boy is a very long time gone."
"Why it's a good long way to the Borough, sir," remon-
strated Mrs. Bardell.
"Ah," said Mr. Pickwick, "very true; so it is."
Mr. Pickwick relapsed into silence, and Mrs. Bardell re-
sumed her dusting.
"Mrs. Bardell," said Mr. Pickwick, at the expiration of a few
minutes.
"Sir," said Mrs. Bardell again.
"Do you think it a much greater expense to keep two peo-
ple, than to keep one?"
"La, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell, colouring up to the
very border of her cap, as she fancied she observed a species
of matrimonial twinkle in the eyes of her lodger; "La, Mr.
Pickwick, what a question!"
"Well, but do you?" inquired Mr. Pickwick.
"That depends-" said Mrs. Bardell, approaching the
duster very near to Mr. Pickwick's elbow, which was planted
on the table- "that depends a good deal upon the person,
you know, Mr. Pickwick; and whether it's a saving and careful
person, sir."
"That's very true," said Mr. Pickwick, "but the person I have
in my eye (here he looked very hard at Mrs. Bardell) I think
possesses these qualities; and has, moreover, a considerable
knowledge of the world, and a great deal of sharpness, Mrs.
Bardell; which may be of material use to me."
"La, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell; the crimson rising to
her cap-border again.
"I do," said Mr. Pickwick, growing energetic, as was his wont
in speaking of a subject which interested him, "I do, indeed;
and to tell the truth, Mrs. Bardell, I have made up my mind."
"Dear me, sir," exclaimed Mrs. Bardell.
"You'll think it very strange now," said the amiable Mr.
Pickwick, with a good-humoured glance at his companion,
"that I never consulted you about this matter, and never even
mentioned it, till I sent your little boy out this morning-eh?"
Mrs. Bardell could only reply by a look. She had long wor-
shipped Mr. Pickwick at a distance, but here she was, all at
[Vol. 20
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once, raised to a pinnacle to which her wildest and most ex-
travagant hopes had never dared to aspire. Mr. Pickwick was
going to propose-a deliberate plan, too-sent her little boy
to the Borough, to get him out of the way-how thoughtful-
how considerate!
"Well," said Mr. Pickwick, "what do you think?"
"Oh, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell, trembling with agita-
tion, "you're very kind, sir."
"It'll save you a good deal of trouble, won't it?" said Mr.
Pickwick.
"Oh, I never thought anything of the trouble, sir," replied
Mrs. Bardell; "and, of course, I should take more trouble to
please you then, than ever; but it is so kind of you, Mr. Pick-
wick, to have so much consideration for my loneliness."
"Ah, to be sure," said Mr. Pickwick; "I never thought of
that. When I am in town, you'll always have somebody to sit
with you. To be sure, so you will."
"I'm sure I ought to be a very happy woman," said Mrs.
Bardell.
"And your little boy-" said Mr. Pickwick.
"Bless his heart!" interposed Mrs. Bardell, with a maternal
sob.
"He, too, will have a companion," resumed Mr. Pickwick, "a
lively one, who'll teach him, I'll be bound, more tricks in a
week than he would ever learn in a year." And Mr. Pickwick
smiled placidly." 6
Mrs. Bardell, sobbing, tells Mr. Pickwick, "I'll never leave you,"
flings her arms around Pickwick's neck, and faints in his arms. 13
7
At that moment, Pickwick's friends and Mrs. Bardell's son enter.
The boy, believing that his mother has been attacked, assails
Pickwick with blows. After the boy is restrained and Mrs. Bardell
recovers and is led downstairs, Pickwick expresses to his friends
his incomprehension of why the lady acted as she did. He ex-
plains, "I had merely announced to her my intention of keeping
a man servant."1 3 8 At that point, Samuel Weller, a young attend-
ant who Pickwick had met earlier, enters the room, and Pickwick
and his new servant go on to new adventures.
139
136. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 12, at 230-32.
137. Id. ch. 12, at 232.
138. Id. ch. 12, at 234.
139. Id. ch. 12, at 234-35.
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This conversation ultimately results in the case of Bardell v.
Pickwick.140 Toward understanding how that litigation came to
be, this article will now focus on the conversation as a text, or
transcript, of the communications between the parties that
forms the basis for the breach of promise suit.
From the perspectives of both the reader and Mr. Pickwick,
the meaning of Mr. Pickwick's words seems clear and utterly un-
ambiguous. Pickwick's statements regarding (i) two living as
cheaply as one, (ii) the confidence that Pickwick has in the quali-
ties and carefulness of the person who Pickwick has in mind, and
(iii) the advantages to Mrs. Bardell and her son of companion-
ship while Pickwick is in town all refer unambiguously to the ser-
vant Pickwick is about to retain. In addition, any other
statements made by Pickwick, such as his resolve in making his
decision or his sending away her son, are not inconsistent with
that meaning. Finally, both Mr. Pickwick and the reader know
that Pickwick has never expressed any romantic interest in Mrs.
Bardell.
For these reasons, Pickwick and the reader cannot conceive
that anyone could properly comprehend his words as anything
but an attempt to discreetly advise Mrs. Bardell that another per-
son, will be lodging in her house, let alone that one could inter-
pret them as a proposal and promise of marriage. From the
reader's perspective, the humor lies in "knowing" Pickwick's lit-
eral meaning, but suspecting that an irrational character might
take a different understanding or, more aptly, a
misunderstanding.
Nevertheless, from Mrs. Bardell's perspective, or interpretive
community, Mr. Pickwick's words unambiguously refer to his de-
sire and proposal to marry her. In fact, Pickwick's words can
have no other meaning when interpreted from the perspective
of a widow who has silently admired him from a distance. More-
over, rather than being a unique, irrational perspective, this in-
terpretative community's interpretation is just as defensible to
itself as that of any other interpretive community's own literal
reading of the text. As the text indicates, Pickwick (i) speaks of
the ability of two living as cheaply as one, (ii) looks "very hard" at
Mrs. Bardell when he speaks of the qualities of the person who
he has in mind, (iii) sent away her child to speak to her on this
subject, and (iv) speaks to her of the companionship to herself
140. I& ch. 34, at 552.
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and her son "[w] hen he is in town." 41 Mrs. Bardell's interpreta-
tive community understands the literal meaning of Pickwick's
words as an unambiguous proposal of marriage.
As Fish explains, every interpretative community's interpreta-
tion of a text is the literal interpretation and no text can be in-
terpreted independent of some interpretative community.1
42
This literal interpretation, however, will vary with the particular
interpretive community. As Fish simply states, "there always will
be a literal reading, but (1) it will not always be the same one
and (2) it can change."14 - Even reading this text as a comic
novel, where it is expected that one character will misunderstand
another character, represents a type of literal reading. As Fish
points out:
If we expect a text to be ambiguous, we will in the act of read-
ing it imagine situations in which it means first one thing and
then another (there is no text with which this cannot be
done), and those plural meanings will, in the context of that
situation, be that text's literal reading.'44
Beyond literary theory, this passage from The Pickwick Papers
casts doubt on the validity of the "objective" meaning doctrine of
the rules of contract formation. That doctrine provides that,
when interpreting communications that might form a contract,
the offer and acceptance must be construed from the "objective"
perspective of a third party and not from the "subjective" under-
standings of either the offeror or the offeree. 1 4' Thus, an of-
feror's understanding is no defense to a breach of contract claim
if an "objective" third party would understand the offer in the
same way the offeree had.
1 46
The Pickwick Papers suggests that some of our most basic no-
tions of "ordinary meaning" are suspect and that the contract
law doctrine of objective, as contrasted to subjective, intent may
not be as reliable as once thought. If that is case, what is the
objective meaning or literal meaning of Pickwick's words to Mrs.
Bardell? From Pickwick's interpretive community, the literal or
141. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 12, at 231.
142. FISH, TEXT, supra note 127, at 277.
143. Id. at 277.
144. 1.
145. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (1990).
146. Id.; SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:1 (Richard A. Lord ed.,
4th ed. 1990). But see ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 106
(1952) (stating that the law of contract cannot be explained by either an objective or
subjective theory of contract formation alone).
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ordinary meaning of his words entails only his landlady's ap-
proval for acquiring a new servant. From Mrs. Bardell's interpre-
tive community, on the other hand, the literal or ordinary
meaning of Pickwick's words only suggests a proposal of
marriage.
There is simply no principled way to choose between the two
interpretations based solely on internal consistency or on the
grounds that the assumptions of one interpretive community
outweigh the assumptions of the other interpretive community.
Furthermore, a reader within yet another interpretive commu-
nity may arrive at a literal or ordinary meaning of Pickwick's
words that differs from either Mr. Pickwick's or Mrs. Bardell's
interpretation. Thus, an objective or literal meaning in the
sense of a meaning that is not both constrained by and based on
the assumptions of an interpretive community does not exist.
The objective intent doctrine of contract formation assumes that
one can choose an interpretation that is independent of and
prior to interpretation.'47 As Fish and The Pickwick Papers
demonstrate, a reader is forced to interpret and cannot rely on
anything the reader may have read before his interpretation be-
cause any interpretation will be a function of the reader's inter-
pretive community.
A similar manifestation of the "literalness" of language occurs
during the trial.'48 Serjeant Buzfuz, counsel to Mrs. Bardell, at-
tempting to prove Pickwick's villainy, addresses the jury regard-
ing some documentary evidence:
"And now, gentlemen, but one word more. Two letters
have been passed between these parties, letters which are ad-
mitted to be in the hand-writing of the defendant, and which
speak volumes indeed. These letters, too, bespeak the charac-
ter of the man. They are not open, fervent, eloquent epistles,
breathing nothing but the language of affectionate attach-
ment. They are covert, sly, underhanded communications,
but, fortunately, far more conclusive than if couched in the
most glowing language and the most poetic imagery-letters
that must be viewed with a cautious and suspicious eye-let-
ters that were evidently intended at the time, by Pickwick, to
mislead and delude any third parties into whose hands they
might fall. Let me read the first:-'Garraway's [a famous cof-
fee-house], twelve o'clock. Dear Mrs. B.-Chops and Tomata
147. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
148. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, supra note 24, ch. 34, at 552.
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sauce. Yours, PICKWICK.' Gentlemen, what does this mean?
Chops and Tomata sauce. Yours, Pickwick! Chops! Gracious
heavens! and Tomata sauce! Gentlemen, is the happiness of
a sensitive and confiding female to be trifled away, by such
shallow artifices as these? The next has no date whatever,
which is in itself suspicious. 'Dear Mrs. B., I shall not be at
home till to-morrow. Slow coach.' And then follows this very
remarkable expression. 'Don't trouble yourself about the
warming-pan.' The warming-pan! Why, gentlemen, who does
trouble himself about a warming-pan? When was the peace
of mind of man or woman broken or disturbed by a warming-
pan, which is in itself a harmless, a useful, and I will add, gen-
tlemen, a comforting article of domestic furniture? Why is
Mrs. Bardell so earnestly entreated not to agitate herself
about this warming-pan, unless (as is no doubt the case) it is a
mere cover for hidden fire-a mere substitute for some en-
dearing word or promise, agreeably to a preconcerted system
of correspondence, artfully contrived by Pickwick with a view
to his contemplated desertion, and which I am not in a condi-
tion to explain? And what does this allusion to the slow coach
mean? For aught I know, it may be a reference to Pickwick
himself, who has most unquestionably been a criminally slow
coach during the whole of this transaction, but whose speed
will now be very unexpectedly accelerated, and whose wheels,
gentlemen, as he will find to his cost, will very soon be
greased by you!"14 9
Aside from its being a marvelous display of lawyerly argument
("which I am not in a condition to explain"),1"' this speech
presents another graphic display of the nonliteralness of words.
To Pickwick's interpretive community and that of most readers,
these brief letters, while not totally explicable, represent only
mundane correspondence between a tenant and his landlady
with no reference to romantic attachments, covert or otherwise.
Yet, the reader also simultaneously understands that, as part of
the comic conventions of this novel, other characters such as
Serjeant Buzfuz will misunderstand the letters. This misunder-
standing provides further humorous effect.
However, applying Fish's theories to the explication of Ser-
jeant Buzfuz, an interpretive community could understand the
correspondence to literally refer to secret romantic missives
from Mr. Pickwick to Mrs. Bardell. Such an interpretation does
149. Id. ch. 34, at 562-63.
150. Id. ch. 34, at 563.
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not preclude the literalness of such a reading to an interpretive
community. Instead, the reader's almost universal understand-
ing illustrates "the conditions of intelligibility that limit the
meanings words can have before they are produced."15 1 The
very ability of Serjeant Buzfuz to cogently argue his interpreta-
tion indicates that such an interpretive community was possible
and not entirely disjunct from "normal" discourse. 152 Thus,
while readers know for certain that the letters are not evidence
of romantic involvement, that knowledge is a function of the
reader's beliefs that may change over time.
Stanley Fish does not directly concern himself with questions
of morality. Nevertheless, his theories directly challenge the de-
terminacy of texts, legal and otherwise, and argue that one can-
not rely on any morality inherent in written laws since any
inherent morality originates from the reader's interpretative
community. One cannot know with certainty that future inter-
pretations of laws and texts one now regards as moral will con-
tinue to be so interpreted in the future. 53 Thus, one cannot
ultimately rely on the law to embody or implement one's moral
beliefs. Rather, one can only rely on interpreters whose inter-
pretive assumptions appear to be moral to arrive at moral read-
ings. In other words, society cannot substitute moral laws for
moral actors who will interpret those indeterminate laws.
V. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DICKENS'S NOVELS
The problematic nature of trying to ascribe the term 'jurispru-
dence" to the fictional writings of a nonlawyer who is more inter-
ested in the settings of the law than the technical rules of law is
obvious. Nevertheless, given the significant amount of attention
that Dickens devotes to the law and lawyers, speaking of "Dick-
ens's jurisprudence" is particularly useful when discussing his
view of the role that law plays in society in general.
151. FIsH, NATURALLY, supra note 127, at 295.
152. Serjeant Buzfuz's speech was adopted by Dickens from a contemporary lawsuit
brought by George Norton against the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, for criminal
conversation. In that case, counsel for the plaintiff made a similar, albeit less compre-
hensive, argument concerning three apparently mundane notes between the parties.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 68-69; Glaser & Roth, supra note 13, at 283.
153. Fish notes that "interpretation is the source of texts, facts, authors, and inten-
tions" and argues that if anything is certain, it is that interpretations will change. FISH,
TEXT, supra note 127, at 16.
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Dickens was not overly interested in specific legal reforms. 154
Whenever he addressed specific abuses in the legal process, such
as in Bleak House, he typically dated the events in the novel sev-
eral decades earlier. He also ignored the fact that specific proce-
dural or substantive problems he was deriding had already been
abolished or significantly reformed. 15 5 Nevertheless, Dickens de-
livers an important, albeit simple, message about the distinction
between morality and the law.
In his essay on Dickens, George Orwell remarked on the fact
that, despite Dickens's exceedingly negative portrayal of lawyers
and the law, Dickens is beloved by the bar:
[O]ne knows without needing to be told that lawyers delight
in Serjeant Buzfuz.... Dickens seems to have succeeded in
attacking everybody and antagonizing nobody. 156
Why do lawyers-at least those who care to read him-love an
author who only seems to castigate them? Ultimately, the signifi-
cance for lawyers is that Dickens allows everyone, even those who
do not practice the moral decency that he preaches, to contem-
plate his moral pronouncements. As Orwell later pointed out,
[I]n his own age and ours [Dickens] has been popular chiefly
because he was able to express in a comic, simplified and
therefore memorable form the native decency of the com-
mon man .... Nearly everyone, whatever his actual conduct
may be, responds emotionally to the idea of human brother-
hood. Dickens voiced a code which was and on the whole still
is believed in, even by people who violate it.
15 7
Thus, Dickens appeals to the lawyers' ideal of human brother-
hood, despite the fact that Dickens (and, in their more reflective
moments, probably many lawyers) believed that the practice of
law frequently violated that same ideal.
Dickens believed that the way to achieve justice was not better
laws or better lawyers, but good acts by good people. No good
was, or could be, achieved in Chancery or in Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.
Those who put their faith in Chancery, such as Richard Car-
stone, were consumed by the law. Rather, the only good
achieved in the novel was through acts of good men such as John
Jarndyce who repudiated all possible involvement and benefit
154. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
155. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
156. ORWELL, supra note 19, at 49.
157. Id. at 103.
1994]
41
Wertheim: Law, Literature and Morality in the Novels of Charles Dickens
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WLLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
from the lawsuit. He achieved justice by helping people person-
ally rather than relying on the law.
Similarly, despite the attorneys and court in Pickwick Papers, or
possibly because of them and their machinations, Samuel Pick-
wick could not obtain justice in the legal system. Rather, justice
only resulted when the moral Pickwick took a moral posture. He
refused to accommodate himself to the dictates of the law at sig-
nificant personal risk and discomfort.
In A Tale of Two Cities, justice triumphed at Charles Darnay's
first trial only because of the quick wit and fortuity of identical
appearance of Sydney Carton. In Darnay's second trial before
the revolutionary French tribunal, justice triumphed because
Sidney Carton, a previously immoral man, decided to make an
unselfish choice to sacrifice his own life to save his rival's life.
This moral choice explicitly draws our attention to the gap be-
tween law and morality which has become one of Dickens's
trademarks.
Finally, the same theme can be elicited from the legal texts
exhibited in Dickens's novels. As the analysis of texts in Bardell v.
Pickwick indicates, texts are not so perspicuous that they can be
depended upon to maintain a constant meaning or to consist-
ently achieve good or moral results. Texts will be interpreted by
readers based upon the assumptions derived from each reader's
interpretive community and this may or may not result in moral
readings. The only assurance that the law will not cause injus-
tice, then, comes when these texts are interpreted by moral indi-
viduals, not from a belief in determinate texts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dickens wrote his novels at a time when many lawyers and
legal institutions were inherently conservative and buttressed the
welfare of the few at the expense of the many.15 His views of the
law and lawyers thus reflect a humanistic and popular hostility to
such institutions. In contrast, the law and lawyers in the United
States today are perceived by many (and by lawyers themselves)
158. See, e.g., Mitchell C. Stein, Law and Legitimacy in England, 1800-1832: Bringing
Professor Hay and Thompson to the Bargaining Table, 68 B.U. L. REv. 621, 640 (1988) (not-
ing that the presence of an ultra-conservative English judiciary in the first half of the
1800s inured to the benefit of the ruling class); see also Stephen B. Presser, The Original
Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 122-25 (1989) (discussing the Conservative move-
ment's influence on the judiciary).
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as being in the vanguard of social change and human better-
ment. 5 9 Dickens's views on social concerns, in contrast to those
on law and lawyers, therefore are likely to strike a responsive
cord in modem-day American liberals. However, his discordant
and unfavorable view of the law and lawyers is an important re-
minder to those who sympathize with his social views to avoid
placing excessive reliance on the efficacy of the law and lawyers
as vehicles for human betterment. Dickens's view is also a re-
minder to not overlook the important role of simple morality
and moral decency in human affairs.
Dickens's novels exemplify the belief that, at best, the law is a
crude tool for achieving moral behavior and socialjustice. Over-
emphasis on the law tends to falsely ennoble the law as the final
statement of morality. Thus, emphasis on the law at the expense
of moral decency results in the view that if certain conduct is
legal, then that conduct is moral and if legal obligations are ful-
filled, then moral obligations are fulfilled. Moreover, emphasis
on the law tends to overestimate the efficacy that a change in the
law has on society. 160
The question remains as to how one determines moral de-
cency. In the absence of law as a guide, must one fall back on
individual or purely subjective determinations of morality? Dick-
ens propounded his view of moral decency in his novels, culmi-
nating in the famous example of the morally transformed
Ebenezer Scrooge.1 61 While morality cannot be circumscribed
by the often fantastic world of Dickens's novels, his works pro-
vide a source for definitions of justice and behavior that are not
159. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Bor* Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the
People to Rise and Battle for Justice; 69 TEx. L. REv. 759, 769 n.49 (1991) (citing data
suggesting that lawyers as a group are more liberal than the general public on virtually
every issue); Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661, 664-65 (1985) (citing stud-
ies reported by H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS IN TOLERANCE (1983) wherein
lawyers were shown to be more civil libertarian than members of the general public, as
well as those considered to be among the "opinion elite").
This view, more prevalent among younger lawyers and those who still consider
themselves as "liberal," is a largely the function of the role of the Warren Court in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. During these years the courts were generally sympathetic to
the views of liberals. SeeJoseph L. Rauh Jr., Historical Perspectives: An Unabashed Liberal
Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 213, 233 (1990) ("It was great
fun to appear before the Warren Court. Maybe this was because I always had the feel-
ing the Chief Warren Court was the answer to liberal prayers").
160. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 4.
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merely reflections of positive law or the morals of the market-
place. As such, Dickens's novels remain timely and relevant
when considering the interaction between morality and the law
and the impact of this interaction on the pursuit and achieve-
ment of justice.
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